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under a will;1° action by bondholders to preserve a bond fund ;17 action
by beneficiaries of a trust estate to recover funds of the estate ;18 and
action by members of a labor union to restore funds to the benefit of
the union and its members.' 9
Since North Carolina has given recognition to this broad doctrine,
will it follow the lead of other jurisdictions and apply the doctrine to
situations other than taxpayers' actions? The answer is clearly uncertain. The court in the principal case expresses no inclination to
have its decision embrace cases other than taxpayers' actions; however,
this does not affect the real significance of the case. The mere recognition of a doctrine which allows recovery of counsel fees as costs
without statutory authorization indicates a tendency by the court to relax its heretofore strict attitude against such allowances. It is suggested
that this tendency be extended so as to allow recovery of counsel fees
as costs in situations other than taxpayers' actions where substantial
justice requires such allowances; thereby bringing North Carolina into
accord with other jurisdictions.
ERVIN I. BAER.
Covenants--Building Restrictions-Violation of a Restriction
Against the Erection of a Duplex
Defendants owned a lot subject to the following restrictions contained in the deed: "Said property shall be used only for residential
purposes with the understanding that no duplex or apartment house
be erected thereon, and shall not be used for cemetery, hospital, sanitorium, or any business purposes." The house upon the lot, as originally
constructed, was not a duplex and was used as a single-family residence.
Subsequently, defendants installed a second kitchen in a basement playroom, rented out three rooms and bath (the newly created kitchen included) to another family, and occupied the balance of the house as
their own home. Plaintiffs, who owned lots in the same division,
subject to the same restrictions, brought an action to enforce the
restrictions in defendants' deed, alleging that defendants' house, as
converted, constituted a duplex in violation of said covenant. At the
close of plaintiffs' evidence defendants' motion for a nonsuit was granted
by the Superior Court on the ground that the evidence failed to show
the construction of a duplex. Affirming this judgment, the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that the conversion of a playroom into a second
"Johnson v. Williams, 196 S. C. 528, 14 S. E. 2d 21 (1941).
"Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (1881).
"IIn re Linch's Estate, 139 Neb. 761, 298 N. W. 697 (1941).
" Marine Cooks' & Stewards' Ass'n v. Weber, 93 Cal. 2d 327, 208 P. 2d 1009
(1949).
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kitchen and renting out rooms, second kitchen included, did not constitute such a structural change as to make the house a duplex in
violation of the restrictive covenant in defendants' deed.,
As a general rule, subject to restrictions contained in his deed, the
owner of land in fee has the right to use the land for any lawful purpose. 2 So fundamental is this right that covenants restricting the use
of the land will be strictly construed by the courts in favor of the free
use of land.3 Where, however, the intent of the parties can be clearly
ascertained with respect to the restrictions imposed, such intent should
govern. 4 In deciding, therefore, whether or not a particular structure
violates a restrictive covenant contained in a deed, the courts attempt
to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties by construing the
"restrictive words" according to their accustomed meaning as used and
understood in the community at large. 5
In applying the general rules of construction above, the courts have
generally agreed that where a covenant restricts the structure to be erected to "a residence" or to "residential purposes," without additional
words of restriction or qualification, the covenant is not broken by
the erection of a multi-family house0 or by the conversion of a single'Jordan v. Orr, 71 S. E. 2d 206 (Ga. 1952). In the view of the court, the
controlling question was whether a building restriction prohibiting the erection
of a duplex was violated by the owner renting out rooms to another family. The
court held that it was not.
- Matthews Real Estate Co. v. National Printing and Engraving Co., 330 Mo.
190, 4& S. W. 2d 911 (1932) ; Paff v. Margerum, N. J. Eq. 74, 142 Adt. 6 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1928) ; Schuman v. Schecter, 215 App. Div. 291, 213 N. Y. Supp. 446
(1926); Ivey v. Blythe, 193 N. C. 705, 138 S. E. 2 (1927).
3Wing v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 472, 101 P. 2d 1099 (1940);
Newton v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 374 Ill. 50, 27 N. E. 2d 821 (1940) ; Glenmore
Distilleries v. Fiorella, 273 Ky. 547, 117 S. W. 2d 173 (1938) ; Whitemarsh v.
Richmond, 179 Md. 523, 20 A. 2d 161 (1941); St. Botolph Club v. Brookline
Trust Co., 292 Mass. 430, 198 N. E. 903 (1936); Wood v. Blancke, 304 Mich.
283, 8 N. W. 2d 67 (1943); Ritzenthaler v. Stehler, 170 Misc. 618, 10 N. Y. S.
2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Edney v. Powers, 224 N. C. 441, 31 S. E. 2d 372 (1944) ;
Pehlert v. Neff, 152 Pa. Super 84, 31 A. 2d 446 (1943) ; State ex rel. Bollenbeck
v. Village of Shorewood Hills, 237 Wis. 501, 297 N. W. 508 (1941).
'Dooley v. Savannah Bank and Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S. E. 2d 522
(1945) ; Broad and Branford Place v. Hochenjos Co., 132 N. J. L. 229, 39 A. 2d
80 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Johnson v. Coulter, 25 App. Div. 697. 297 N. Y. Supp. 345
(1937) ; Starmount Co. v. Greensboro Memorial Park, 233 N. C. 613, 65 S. E. 2d
134 (1951); Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 127 S. E. 697 (1925); Killian
v. Harshaw, 29 N. C. (7 Ired.) 964 (1847).
See note 4 szpra.
Virgin v. Garrett, 233 Ala. 34, 169 So. 711 (1936); Hamm v. Wilson, 169
Ga. 570, 151 S. E. 11 (1930); Yorkway Apartments v. Dundalk Co., 180 Md.
647, 26 A. 2d 398 (1942); Davis v. Sarvari, 250 Mich. 427, 230 N. W. 176
(1930); Miller v. Ettinger, 235 Mich. 527, 209 N. W. 568 (1926); Crane v.
Hathaway, 4 N. J. Misc. 293, 132 Atl. 748 (Ch. 1926); Sweet v. Hollearn, 142
Misc. 408, 254 N. Y. Supp. 625 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; Pierson v. Rellstab Bros., 246
N. Y. 608, 159 N. E. 671 (1927) ; Bowers v. Fifth Avenue and 77th Street Corp.,
125 Misc. 343, 209 N. Y. Supp. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; De Laney v. Van Ness, 193
N. C. 721, 138 S. E. 28 (1927) ; Satterwaite v. Gibbs, 288 Pa. 428, 156 Atl. 862
(1927) ; Jernigan v. Capps, 187 Va. 73, 45 S. E. 2d 886 (1947).
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house.7

family house into a multi-family
On the other hand, where
the covenant restricts the structure to be erected to "one residence," "a
private dwelling," "a single dwelling" or other restrictions of similar
import, without additional words of qualification, the courts have
generally held that the erection of even a two-family house8 or the conversion of a single-family house into a two-family house9 constitutes a
violation of the covenent. In each of these cases, the court construed
the restrictive words and rendered its decision with a view to effectuating the intent of the parties. Thus, restrictions to "a residence"
or "residential purposes" were construed as the manifestation of an
intention to preserve only a general residential atmosphere. Those
restrictions to "single" or "private" residences and dwellings were
construed, however, as the indicia of an intention not only to preserve
a general residential atmosphere but also to restrict the style of the
house to that of a "single-family." Consequently, it follows that a
multi-family house would not violate the restrictive covenants in the
former instance, but would do so in the latter.
Where, as in the principal case, a covenant not only restricts the
land to "residential purposes" but goes further to prohibit the erection
of a "duplex" and "use" of the property for enumerated purposes, the
courts disagree as to what constitutes a "duplex" in violation of the
covenant. 10 This disagreement seems to stem from the divergent
definitions of a "duplex house" formulated by the courts in their effort to effectuate the intent of the parties."' That is to say, whether
'Leverich v. Roy, 338 Il1. App. 248, 87 N. E. 2d 226 (1947) ; Ulmer v. Ulrey,
280 Ky. 457, 133 S. W. 2d 744 (1940); Bennett v. Petrino, 235 N. Y. 474, 139
N. E. 578 (1923) ; Austin v. Richardson, .. Tex ..... 288 S. W. 180 (1926).
Michigan Shores Estates v. Robbins, 290 Mich. 384, 287 N. W. 547 (1939)
(one residence only) ; Nerrerter v. Little, 258 Mich., 462, 243 N. W. 25 (1932)
(dwelling house only); Seeley v. Phi Sigma Delta Corp., 245 Mich. 252, 222
N. W. 180 (1928) (private dwelling only); Bailey v. Jackson-Campbell Co.,
191 N. C. 61, 131 S. E. 567 (1926) (not more than one house) ; Lebo v. Fitton,
71 Ohio App. 192, 41 N. E. 2d 402 (1942) (single dwelling only).
'Hooker v. Alexander, 129 Conn. 433, 29 A. 2d 308 (1943) (one family house
only) ; Allen v. Barrett, 213 Mass. 36, 99 N. E. 575 (1912) (a single-family
house) ; Paine v. Bergrose, 119 Misc. 796, 198 N. Y. Supp. 311 (Sup. Ct. 1922)
(private dwelling only); Upper Arlington Co. v. Lawwell, 20 Ohio App. 362,
152 N. E. 203 (1915) (single private dwelling only); Gerstell v. Knight, 245
Pa. 83, 26 A. 2d 329 (1942) (one resident only).
'See note 16 infra.
11 Baker v. Lunde, 96 Conn. 530, 114 Atl. 673 (1921)
(a double house having
one continuous roof) ; Donnelly v. Spitza, 246 Mich. 284, 222 N. W. 396 (1929)
(a house designed for two families); Kenwood Land Co. v. Hancock Investment Co., 169 Mo. App. 715, 155 S. W. 861 (1913) (a double house or a house
in duplicate) ; Hammett v. Born, 247 Pa. 148, 93 Atl. 505 (1915) (a house designed for occupancy of two families under one roof); Schwarser v. Calcasian
Lumber Co., 176 S. W. 2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) (a building designed for
two families, divided vertically down the middle). See also Edwards v. City
of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. App. 2d 62, 119 P. 2d 370 (1941) (dicta to effect that
a duplex may'in fact be apartments or flats).
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the court will decide that a particular structure is a "duplex" in violation of a covenant prohibiting its erection will depend not upon universal definitive terminology but rather upon the term "duplex" as
used and understood in the community at large.' 2
Thus, if the building is designed, both exteriorly and interiorly, as
two houses under one roof, each complete in itself, with a partition
between and separate entrances, the courts have held it to be a duplex
in violation of a covenant restricting the land to "residential purposes"
and prohibiting the erection of a "duplex."'- The reason being that
the parties intended to preserve a residential atmosphere and to restrict the style of structure to that of a single-family house. Where,
however, the building erected, as in the principal case, has the conventional exterior design of a "single-family house" but is being used
interiorly as a "double-family house," there is sharp conflict among the
courts as to whether it violates the covenant prohibiting the erection of
a "duplex."' 4
The strict construction, followed by the court in the principal case,
is that where a portion of the covenant restricts the type of structure
to be erected, its use is not to be considered to be restricted where elsewhere in the covenant are enumerated specific uses which are not permitted, and the use complained of is not one of those excluded.' 5 Accordingly, if the structure is being used as a residence, although by two
families with separate living accommodations, and is exteriorly designed
as a single-family residence, the courts following this view refuse to
hold it to be a "duplex" in violation of the covenant. 6 The other and
more liberal construction, is that the building restriction to "a residence"
and "no duplex" defines the use to which the building may be put as
well as its exterior form notwithstanding the fact that such use is not
one of those elsewhere prohibited in the covenant. 7 The courts following this view have held houses with a "single-family residence"
exterior design but being used interiorly as a "two-family residence"
to be a duplex in violation of the covenant.' 8
'
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See note 11 supra.

Hooker v. Alexander, 129 Conn. 433, 29 A. 2d 308 (1943) ; Upper Arlington

Company v. Lawwell, 20 Ohio App. 362, 152 N. E. 203 (1915); Ward v. Prospect Manor Corp., 188 Wis. 534, 206 N. W. 856 (1926).
"' Jordan v. Orr, 71 S. E. 2d 206 (Ga. 1952); Renn v. Whitehurst, 181 Va.
360, 25 S.E. 2d 276 (1945). See also cases cited in notes 15-17 inira.
"Clark v. James, 87 Hun 215, 33 N. Y. Supp. 1020 (Sup. Ct. 1895). See
note, 155 A. L. R. 1012 (1945).
" Leverich v. Roy, 338 Ill. App. 248, 87 N. E. 2d 226 (1947); Ulmer v.
Ulrey, 280 Ky. 457, 133 S. W. 2d 744 (1940); Bennett v. Petrino, 235 N. Y.
474, 139 N. E. 578 (1923); Austin v. Richardson, ... Tex. ... , 288 S. W. 180

(1926).

17 Michigan Shores Estates v. Robbins, 290 Mich. 384, 287 N. W. 547 (1939);
Straus v. Ginsberg, 218 Minn. 57, 15 N. W. 2d 130 (1944) ; Ritzenthaler v. Stehler, 170 Misc. 618, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 89& (Sup. Ct. 1939); Pulitzer v. Campbell,
147 Misc. 700, 262 N. Y. Supp. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
" See note 17 supra.
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While North Carolina has followed the general rules that a restriction to "residential purposes only" is not violated by the erection
of or conversion into a multi-family house,"0 but that such an erection
or conversion does violate a restriction to a "private dwelling" or
"single-family house," 20 our court has not decided the question involved
in the principal case. 2 ' Past decisions indicate, however, that the decision, if and when rendered, would be substantially in accord with that
in the instant case.2 2 In view of the fact that the modern tendency is
not to imply restrictions which might or ought to have been written
in by the parties, it is submitted that the view taken in the principal
23
case, although the stricter, is nevertheless the sounder view.
JOSEPH P. HENNESSEE.
Damages-Mental Anguish-Action Arising Out of Tort
Recently, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld a lower court
decision that damages could be recovered for mental anguish resulting
from the unauthorized removal of flowers from the grave of a deceased
spouse. The court, in rendering its decision, held that the plaintiff
could recover damages for the mental anguish endured by him as a
result of the trespass to his burial lot regardless of whether or not he
suffered physical injury. 1
" De Laney v. Van Ness, 193 N. C. 721, 138 S. E. 28 (1927).
20

'

East Side Builders v. Brown, 234 N. C. 517, 67 S. E. 2d 489 (1951).

This question appeared, however, in East Side Builders v. Brown, 234
N. C. 517, 67 S. E. 2d 489 (1951), where the restriction was to "single-family
residences." It was not answered, however, the case being reversed on other
grounds. It has not been retried, pending the decision in Huffman v. Johnson,
236 N. C. 225 (1952). This latter case has recently been decided in favor of
the free use of the land. It adds little to the law, and is distinguishable from
the principal case and from East Side Builders v. Brown, supra, in that there
was no allegation or proof of the installation of a second kitchen and the formation of a separate apartment, or that a separate apartment was in fact rented.
22 The North Carolina view is that the covenant must be strictly construed,
Starmont Co. v. Greensboro Memorial Park, 233 N. C. 613, 65 S. E. 2d 134
(1951), in favor of the free use of the land, Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589,
127 S. E. 697 (1925); and that restrictions should be created in plain and explicit terms, Ivey v. Blythe, 193 N. C. 705, 138 S. E. 2 (1927). A restriction to
"residence" or "residential purposes" will not prohibit the erection of a multifamily house, De Laney v. Van Ness, 193 N. C. 721, 138 S. E. 28 (1927). A
residence occupied by four families is no less a residential building. That it is
intended to accommodate more than one family does not ipso facto bring it within
what is forbidden. Charlotte Consol. Construction Co. v. Cobb, 195 N. C. 690,
143 S. E. 522 (1928).
But see Bailey v. Jackson-Campbell Co., 191 N. C. 61,
131 S. E. 567 (1926) where the court held that an apartment house is not a
"residence" within a covenant providing that "not more than one residence shall
be built."
" It is suggested that if the intent of the parties is to restrict the property to

single-family use only, the covenant should read: "Said property is restricted
to the erection and maintenance of a single-family type residence, with the understanding said residence shall not be used by more than a single family." This
or similarly worded restrictions leave no doubt as to the intent of the parties.
" Matthews v. Forrest, 235 N. C. 281. 69 S. E. 2d 553 (1952).

